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Abstract
Drama theory provides  a  means  of  modelling  pre-play  communication:  that  is  the  exchanges  which  take  place
between parties as they collectively shape the confrontational arena within which they must  eventually  take  decisive
action.   Participants communicate objects called  ‘positions’  and  ‘intentions’  and  share  their  ‘doubts’  about  each
others’  declarations.   On  the  basis  of  this  ‘communicated  common  knowledge’  those  involved,  seeking  to  act
rationally, normally experience dilemmas.  These prompt them to devise frame-breaking changes  that  alter  the  form
of the interaction, perhaps placing additional pressure upon some parties whilst relieving that  experienced  by  others.
At some point these changes cease and the participants play their actions, possibly using game theory to  inform  their
individual strategies.  Within this context, this paper explores the process of dilemma elimination,  specifically  seeing
whether  there  may  be  favourable  sequences  that  could  be  adopted:  these  would  show  a  commander  the  most
beneficial route for advantageously resolving confrontations with other parties.  Such sequences would both reduce or
eliminate the commander’s own dilemmas, whilst aggravating or otherwise engineering those facing  other  parties  so
as to render them more compliant.  The paper uses a new version of drama theory (DT2) that offers a  simpler  but  no
less powerful formulation of the dilemmas which has as yet not been widely applied in any field.
1. Introduction
Typically the focus of energy for today’s commander is in bringing a  disparate  set  of  contending  (and  supporting)
parties into compliance with his will.  However, the  commander’s  objective  itself  reflects  an  interpretation  of  the
wishes of a diffuse amalgam of political forces to which he is ultimately responsible.  There is thus a nested hierarchy
of arenas in each of which parties seek  to  achieve  their  objectives  by  influencing  and  changing  the  intentions  of
others: at the highest level nation states or alliances engage in diplomacy or commit  to  war;  at  strategic  and  theatre
levels commanders engage in confrontations  with  or  campaigns  against  their  counterparts  in  hostile  and  alliance
forces; and at tactical level warriors engage directly as they  challenge  or  fight  with  opponents.   In  every  case  the
purpose of communications and of actions is to shift others’ intentions; or if it seems that this cannot be attained,  then
to destroy their ability to achieve these intentions.  On these grounds it has been  argued  (Smith  et  al.,  2001)  that  a
confrontation perspective enables a unified theory of military operations wherein the effective management of  lower-
level confrontations and conflicts contribute jointly to reaching desired political ends.
This paper presents an analytical framework for supporting the management of  confrontations.   Through  a  simple
example the use of this framework is demonstrated.  The core concept of  dilemma  management  is  further  explored
and the opportunity for identifying generic pathways for handling confrontations is sketched.
2. Confrontation Analysis
Confrontation analysis is a formal approach for representing, analysing  and  directing  communication  and  action  in
confrontations.  It captures the stand of each party in terms  of  their  opportunities  for  autonomous  choice  over  the
messages  that  they  send  or  the  things  that  they   do.    A   party’s   stand   comprises   its   declared   position,   its
stated intentions and its expressed doubts:
• The position taken by a party is its proposed solution to the confrontation.
• Having knowledge of all parties’ declared positions each party states its intentions
• All parties will harbour doubts about others’ positions or intentions  
Taken as a whole the stands adopted by the parties in a situation  are  likely  to  present  them  with  problems.   If  the
parties’ positions are not in accord then any party may find either that:
• It has no doubt that others will flout its position, or
• Others doubt that it will flout their position(s)
While even if the parties’ positions are compatible then some of them may find that:
• They doubt others’ commitment to support their own (or a shared) position
The handling of these specific dilemmas is the core of confrontation management.
Taking as an example the standoff (at the time of writing) between  Iran  and  the  West  over  uranium  enrichment.
Iran has been offered the incentive of support for a peaceful nuclear  programme  and  some  lifting  of  existing  trade
sanctions  if  it  suspends  its  enrichment  activities  and  permits  international  inspections  of  its  installations.   The
situation is represented by the options board in Table 1 (’options’ are the action choices available to a party).
___________________________________________________________________________
|                         |t    |I    |W    |DI             |DW             |
|IRAN                     |                                                  |
|  halt nuclear programme |(    |(    |? (  |none           |Perp           |
|WEST                     |                                                  |
|  impose additional      |? (  |(    |(    |none           |Rejt           |
|sanctions                |     |     |     |               |               |
TABLE 1.  Options Board for Iraq nuclear issue
___________________________________________________________________________
Making simplifying assumptions for the sake of illustration, the Iranian position (column headed ’I’) is that they do
not halt their nuclear programme (signified by ‘(’) and that the West do not impose additional sanctions - rather the
latter’s should be lifted.  The position of the West is that the nuclear programme is halted (signified by ’(’) and that no
additional sanctions should be imposed.  Given these incompatible ’solutions’, the Iranian intention is not to halt the
nuclear programme (’(’ against this option in the intentions column headed ’t’ for ’threatened future’), while the
West’s intention is that it imposes additional sanctions (’(’ for this option in column ’t’).  Additionally some doubts
have been shown, indicated by question marks in relevant cells of the table: the West doubts that Iran could be trusted
to halt its nuclear programme; the Iranians doubt that the West would actually impose its threatened sanctions.
Considering now each option in turn the West has no doubt that the Iranians will flout their position on halting the
nuclear programme: this gives the West a so-called Persuasion dilemma (on account of the Iranian position) as the
West feels powerless to persuade Iran not to do so.  And looking at the West’s option of imposing additional
sanctions, this also causes a dilemma for the West - a so-called Rejection dilemma in threat mode - because the
West’s threat is not credible in the eyes of Iran.  The consequence is that the West faces two dilemmas and Iran faces
none.  This makes the situation uncomfortable for the West while Iran feels no corresponding pressure.
3.  Dilemma Management
There is no unique way of handling each of the generic dilemmas uncovered by confrontation
analysis.  Figure 1 shows possible pathways for each type of dilemma (the Trust dilemma will be
discussed below).
FIGURE 1.  Pathways for dilemma elimination.
Returning to the illustrative example, how might the West deal with its two dilemmas?  The answer must lie
’outside the box’ of the present impasse.  So President Obama’s offer of an ’extended hand’ to Iran (i.e. a proposal of
talks between Iran and the so-called P5+1) represents a ’soft’ maintenance of the West’s position.  It could be argued
that by offering talks coupled with a declaration that further sanctions will be applied should no progress be made by
the end of the year, Obama is actually reinforcing the message that sanctions may be applied: that is, he is removing
Iran’s doubt about the US determination to impose this penalty - and so is also eliminating the West’s Rejection
dilemma.  This corresponds to the pathway in Figure 1 from ’B has a Rejection Dilemma’ through ’B says its
Intention is possible’: and in the present instance this would give Iran instead a Persuasion dilemma.  He is also
providing Iran with a new option (to engage in talks with the West) but this alone doesn’t introduce any fresh
dilemmas, assuming that Iran doesn’t declare a view as to whether or not it is prepared to do this.   A modified
options board is shown in Table 2.
___________________________________________________________________________
|                         |t    |I    |W    |DI             |DW             |
|IRAN                     |                                                  |
|  halt nuclear programme |(    |(    |? (  |none           |Perp           |
|  Engage in talks with   |~    |~    |(    |               |               |
|West                     |     |     |     |               |               |
|WEST                     |                                                  |
|  impose additional      | (   |(    |(    |Pert           |none           |
|sanctions                |     |     |     |               |               |
TABLE 2.  Revised Options Board for Iraq nuclear issue
___________________________________________________________________________
To remove its own initial Persuasion dilemma the West might try to increase the attraction of its own position to
Iran (e.g. by offering strong support for a civilian nuclear programme in Iran) or alternatively make the continuation
of the present Iranian enrichment strategy less appealing (e.g. by encouraging Israel to make hawkish gestures).  This
could alter Iran’s position and intention on the halting of its nuclear programme.
4.  Beneficial Pathways
Clearly dilemma elimination in any actual confrontation is always an  ongoing process, for each party will be seeking,
whether intuitively or as the result of analysis to improve its own situation; and possibly to worsen the situation for
the others.  Needless to say an underwriting of analysis is more likely to succeed.  A more rounded appreciation of
this interactive process was provided by Howard (1999) who  scripted as a play the fictionalized use of confrontation
analysis in a peace mission.
Given a commander’s aim, stated at the beginning of this paper, of securing the compliance of other parties, the
question may be asked as to whether there may be some ideal means of achieving this?   Figure 1 provides some
clues, but cannot offer general prescriptions because the approach must depend upon the particularities of each
situation.  For example, it can be seen from the Figure that a party which abandons its position and adopts that of its
opponents will normally shed its dilemmas: however what is not shown in the diagram is first the scepticism that this
may arouse in the other as to whether this is a genuine change of heart, and second the mood of despair that would
likely accompany a genuine withdrawal (this in turn potentially leading to resentment and perhaps a desire for later
revenge).  More constructively the diagram shows the significance of doubts (or their absence) in the overall process
of dilemma creation and elimination, and so shows in a systematic manner the relevance and power of strategic
communication as an adjunct to the stating and restating of positions in confrontations.
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